We study the early adoption of Twitter in the 111 th House of Representatives. Our main objective is to determine whether successes of past adopters have the tendency to speed up Twitter adoption, where past success is defined as the average followers per Tweet -a common measure of "Twitter success" -among all prior adopters. The data suggests that accelerated adoption can be associated with favorable past outcomes: increasing the average number of followers per Tweet among past adopters by a standard deviation (of eight followers per Tweet) accelerates the adoption time by about 112 days. This acceleration effect is weaker for those who already have adopted Facebook and those who have access to information about a large number of past adopters. We later find a positive relationship between an adopter's own success and the success of adopters preceding him/her. Thus, there may exist benefits associated with adopting Twitter based on past successes of others. In general, the patterns we find are consistent with predictions generated by a simple model of adoption delay with learning.
Introduction
Social learning can occur under two general contexts. Agents within a community can learn from one another through past actions or outcomes of their peers. While economic theory gives us a rich set of predictions for both contexts, the general body of empirical literature has primarily focused on identifying these peer effects under the context of social learning through observed actions, despite the fact that clean identi cation of these effects associated with peer behavior is inherently hard (if not impossible). For one thing, these so-called peer effects may be spurious and even if they are not, they are not necessarily caused by learning, as competing explanations involving crowding and network externalities often play a (larger) role. Using information about past outcomes would certainly alleviate some of these identi cation problems. We conjecture that this void in the literature is likely due to the fact that obtaining data on both agent behavior and their relevant outcomes is hard to come by. Consequently, this paper proposes using data from the recent Twitter adoption craze among American Congressional members to address some of these de ciencies in current research.
Our data about Twitter adoption on the 111th House of Representatives is interesting for two reasons: 1) we can observe the precise day in which a representative made his rst Twitter post (i.e., the date of adoption); and 2) their realized and publicly observable success at attaining followers per Twitter post (i.e., a typical metric for in uence on Twitter 1 ). The order of each politician's adoption allows us to measure the potential amount of information available to them at the time of adoption; that is, for each adopter, we can approximate the success of his predecessors he can potentially observe. Therefore, we can estimate the link between positive information -in the form of large averages for the followers/Tweet among past adopters -and the date of adoption for a politician in question that may exist. Given the novelty of Twitter in general, we expect that these information signals generated by past adoption behavior to play some role in the decisions of potential adopters. Even though the monetary cost of opening a Twitter account is zero, politicians may hesitate to adopt Twitter right away if doing so yields lackluster follower/Tweet statistics, thereby revealing their weak support. However, if they observe that other politicians have been successful at maintaining a follower base, then adopting soon after may also generate these bene ts.
We rst establish a relationship between the incentive to adopt early and favorable signals using a simple model of delay. In the model, a risk averse agent has to decide whether to adopt a new technology of uncertain value today, or wait until tomorrow. By waiting until the next period, he enjoys the possibility of re-ceiving an additional information signal (on top of the set already available to him). Because he discounts the future, this updated posterior comes at a price. In light of favorable signals, the incentive to adopt right away increases: any value that comes from an additional signal next period will be outweighed by the opportunity cost of missing out on a high expected payoff (based on less information). The model also predicts that the agent will not wish to wait if his initial prior is already precise. Furthermore, the impact associated with favorable signals is dampened if the agent has already observed a large number of signals. In other words, these signals matter very little to those who are already knowledgeable. Our last observation from this model is that the marginal impact associated with favorable signals is concave.
Interpreting the followers/Tweet outcomes among past adopters as information signals, we estimate the impact that these signals have on the number of days it takes a politician to adopt Twitter. Our baseline estimates reveal that a standard deviation increase in the average followers/Tweet among past adopters decreases the time of adoption by about 112 days. Furthermore, those who have already adopted Facebook, are less in uenced by increases in the average followers/Tweet based on past information. As Facebook and Twitter are very similar, one may argue that those with Facebook have a more precise prior about the merits of Twitter; thus, these patterns are consistent with what our simple model predicts. Similarly, we nd that the acceleration effect associated with favorable information is also dampened by the number of past adopters. Those who already have, potentially, access to a large set of signals may not enjoy much additional value in waiting for new signals.
Further analysis of our data reveals an interesting lag structure between a Twitter user's own success, and the success of those before him: increasing the average followers/Tweet among past adopters is associated with an increase in a current adopter's own followers/Tweet by a proportional amount. In other words, a politician who adopts soon after successful Twitter adopters may enjoy success himself. This result suggests that these information signals can actually bene t Twitter users.
Our extensions show that recent information about past adoption outcomes has a greater impact on older information about past adoption outcomes; however, more information in general has a greater impact on behavior and own realized outcome. We also consider the possibility that politicians react not to the raw information available to them about past outcomes, but instead, compare these observed outcomes to some expectation. As such, we evaluate the impact that positive and negative surprises have on the speed of adoption. Not surprisingly, an increase in the proportion of positive surprises associated with past outcomes accelerates adoption, while an increase in the average number of negative surprises decelerates adoption. Finally, we are able to nd that while politicians do not appear to react differently to information sources coming from within and outside their home state, only those whose adoption occurs after a sequence of successful outcomes within the same state actually bene t. One may then stipulate the existence of some informational advantage associated with geography.
Why should politicians even care about how many users follow them on Twitter? Users who follow a politician will continually be updated with that politician's newest micro-blog entry. Those who choose to follow a politician are most likely people who actually want to read and pay attention to his content. Therefore, a person adds a politician to his follower list essentially designates this politician as an opinion leader (Boynton, 2010) . Being an opinion leader may help a politician push controversial policies or satisfy his need for narcissistic self promotion (McFedries, 2007) . In general, Twitter itself also cares about how many followers its users have. An important and ef cient way to catalyze user generated content within a social network is to increase the number of captive followers/friends/readers each user has. Recent studies have shown that content generation largely depends on the size of a user's group of friends (Hofstetter, Shriver, and Nair, 2010; Zhang and Zhu, 2010 ). Twitter's role is to stimulate group formation, and what it gets in return is free content from its users. Not surprisingly, many social media outlets now push friendship/follower recommendations.
There are a number of confounding factors that can potentially discount our results. The rst issue has to do with unobserved heterogeneity, or permanent correlated effects among adopters around similar time periods using Manski's (1993) terminology. While our data lacks the necessary panel structure for xed effects estimation, we argue that under some assumptions, controlling for the order of entry may control for omitted variables such as unobserved adoption costs. The second issue has to do with sample selection, in that the adoption times we observe are only for those who adopted. We also acknowledge that some of the adoption decisions may have been made deterministically around the time of the start of of ce (January 20, 2009) , or that information signals received by the earliest adopters are based on too few observations. Given that each politician makes his adoption decision in sequence, a relevant concern is temporal correlation of error terms across adopters around similar time intervals. This issue can be framed under Manski's setting as a transitory correlated effect, in that early adopters could in fact face similar timesensitive shocks as their peers. Finally, contextual effects may also mislead us about the impact of past information. For instance, powerful politicians are likely to have a strong following on Twitter. Those who adopted soon after may not be doing so to exploit information externalities, but instead, making a desperate attempt to reach out to their peers with clout.
Our estimates appear to be robust to many of these problems, though, the magnitude of the acceleration effect associated with favorable past information drops considerably (but remains positive at a statistically signi cant level) when we control for autocorrelated errors. This caveat is likely the result from the fact that these decisions are often made days from one another. We view this limitation as a unique trade-off that our data presents: on the one hand, the sequential order of observed behavior and outcomes allows us to circumvent a number of simultaneity problems associated with typical peer effects model, but on the other hand, this very sequential nature introduces temporal persistence of shocks that we are unable to control (i.e., increasing media awareness about the effectiveness of Twitter as a self-promotion tool).
An alternative explanation for the patterns we observed is based on the idea of network externalities. If the average followers/Tweet proxies for potential interactions between politicians on Twitter, then the observed acceleration effect can be explained by some politicians wishing to wait until the online social network reaches some critical mass. Once they see that a large number of peers have already adopted, then Twitter is viewed as a valuable outlet to communicate with one another; note that under this alternative, politicians are not actually learning from one another. Unfortunately, we are unable to completely rule out the competing network effects story, as better data is needed. However, recent textual analysis by Golbeck, Grimes and Rogers (2010) hints that Twitter is primarily used as a 1-way broadcasting device to spread information about them (for self promotion) and their forthcoming policies. They nd that among the rare instances that 2-way communication actually takes place, these Tweets are 7 times more likely to be between non-politicians than fellow politicians. Therefore, our prior is that these network effects are unlikely to completely wash away the conjectured learning effects we nd.
Aside from providing us a useful setting to study sequential learning, the use of Twitter in politics is itself an interesting and important topic. The desire to get all American politicians onto Twitter has led to organizations like TweetCongress.org, whose mandate is to encourage all politicians to adopt Twitter as a means to increase government transparency 2 . Although it is not obvious whether politicians are using Twitter for outreach or transparency (Chi and Ya n g , 2010; Felten, 2009; Golbeck, Grimes, and Rogers, 2010) , the role of Twitter represents a shift away from traditional government operations towards so-called E-Government. Perhaps the strongest motivation for E-Government is a recent study by Andersen (2009) , which nds that the corruption index is typically lower for countries which employ E-Government practices. Not surprisingly, Twitter has marketed itself as a useful about their platforms/policies 3 . This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we outline recent and relevant literature that has motivated this paper. Section 3 describes the unique data we hand-collected. We then proceed to describe a simple model of adoption delay in order to generate some predictions that can be tested with the data on hand. Our empirical methodology is described in Section 5; included in that discussion is also a list of identi cation problems that we attempt to address. The main results are presented in Section 6. We then conclude the paper in Section 7.
Related literature
Our work is most related to recent empirical work that aims to identify social learning. As mentioned earlier, there are two main approaches to identify social learning 4 . The rst is to infer learning based on the impact that peer behavior/perception has one's own behavior/perception. Some examples include the analysis of how average perceptions of HIV/AIDS risk within a social network affects one's own perception (Kohler, Behrman, and Watkins, 2007) , the increased likelihood of purchasing a computer if a large proportion of neighbors have already done so (Goolsbee and Klenow, 2002) , and how the adoption of new crops is affected by the adoption choices of farmers within a social network of friends and family (Bandiera and Rasul, 2006) .
The second approach, which is the one we incorporate, is to investigate whether past observable outcomes (affecting peers) has an impact on one's own behavior. Notable examples include the analysis of how box of ce surprises in opening weekend demand affect subsequent sales of movies (Moretti, 2010) , whether the performance of schools that use new educational products/programs has an impact on the propensity that subsequent schools also adopt these products/programs (Forbes, 2009) , and the impact of past farming outcomes within a social network affects a farmer's input decision (Conley and Udry, 2010) . Our work complements the existing literature by offering a new perspective about sequential learning: instead of looking at how past outcomes affect the propensity to adopt, we investigate how past outcomes affect delay of adoption. By focusing on delay, we allow for the possibility of strategic learning. An agent may have an incentive to delay entry into Twitter so as to take full advantage these informational externalities bring. 3 Refer to Mashable's article "Twitter Goes to Washington, Hires Former Congressional Staffer" by Jolie O'Dell on November 4, 2010 (http://mashable.com/2010/11/04/twitter-washington/). 4 Another approach is to incorporate structural econometric estimation, such as Buera, MongeNaranjo, and Primiceri (2010) in their study of Bayesian learning among policy makers across countries.
tool for politicians to stay connected with their constituents and to inform the public 5 Strategic learning is a heavily studied topic in economic theory. Perhaps the most relevant models are those proposed by Caplin and Leahy (1998), and Chamley and Gale (1994) . Although the methods they use to study social learning are different, they both come to similar conclusions: the existence of information externalities may delay entry into uncertain environments. This incentive to "wait-and-see" has been used to explain a number of economic phenomena, such as slow recoveries after economic recessions, and investment lags into local/global markets.
In general, the empirical analysis of social learning is nested within the study of peer/network effects. Identifying peer effects is particularly challenging. As Manski (1993) points out, even if endogeneity and simultaneity of actions are addressed, the identi cation of peer effects are confounded by contextual and correlated group effects. Contextual effects refer to the fact that characteristics of a group may be driving the behavior of an agent in question, not the behavior of peers. Correlated effects refer to the fact that those in the same group may act in a similar manner for some unforeseen reason. In spite of these challenges, a number of interesting applications 5 have emerged, such as the study of peer effects under the context of school performance (Sacerdote, 2001) , academic research (Waldinger, 2007) , voting behavior among politicians (Cohen and Malloy, 2010) , role of connections in institutional investing (Cohen, Frazzini and Malloy, 2009) , and worker productivity (Mas and Moretti, 2009) . A common way to address contextual effects is to include characteristics associated with the peers 6 , as done in Markman et. al. (2003) . To address correlated effects, one obvious approach would be to add group xed effects, as done in Fletcher (2010) . Contextual effects under the context of Twitter adoption may be related to the idea that politicians are adopting quickly not because of the information from past adoption outcomes, but because past adopters are high pro le and well connected politicians whom potential adopters wish to connect with via Twitter. Correlated effects may come in two forms, xed or transitory. For instance, early adopters may adopt early simply because they are comfortable with technology and therefore face the lowest intangible adoption costs; alternatively, early adopters may adopt early because they all faced similar transitory shocks, such as a recently published news report in the NY Times about the explosive growth of Twitter membership.
Twitter adoption in politics has also received growing attention in political science. Two recent studies by Williams and Gulati (2010) and Lassen and Brown (2010) try to characterize who adopts Twitter. Aside from nding a strong correlation between being a Republican and Twitter use, these two studies are unable to explain why some politicians adopt Twitter, while others do not. Their studies belong to the stream of research about government communications and political marketing. Research in economics about political marketing is rather scarce. One example though is research by Gordon and Hartmann (2010) , who build a structural econometric model of advertising competition between political candidates.
Finally, one may frame the Twitter adoption decision as Karshenas and Stoneman's (1993) interpretation of technology diffusion 7 . The authors argue that rank, stock and order effects matter in the timing of technology adoption. Rank effects are described as the inherent characteristics that differ across potential adopters, stock effects pertain to the idea that the bene t of technology adoption may fall as the number of past adopters increases, and order effects may suggest that early adopters have some form of rst mover advantage.
Data
The setting for our analysis is the recent adoption of Twitter among members in the 111th House of Representatives. Our sample contains information about 438 politicians, 183 of whom adopted Twitter. Furthermore, the data can be broken down into four main components. Each variable is listed and described in Table 1 . The rst and most important subset of variables contains hand-collected information about each adopter's Twitter behavior, such as the exact date in which his rst Twitter post was made 8 , as well as the number of followers, users followed, and posts made at the time of our data collection (May 24, 2010) .
With the exception of Eric Cantor, all House Representatives adopted Twitter after President Barack Obama's rst Twitter post on April 29, 2007. Consequently, we construct our key dependent variable, the number of days to adopt, to be equal to the number of days it took for an adopter to make his rst Tweet, since Barack Obama's rst Twitter post. As Figure 1 shows, there were not many adopters initially, followed by a gradual growth in adoption. The average adopter took about 695 days (after the President) to adopt Twitter. Clearly, the adoption of Twitter did not occur overnight. 7 The literature about technology diffusion is very large. That said, refer to Federica (2002) for a general overview of these studies. On a similar note, Forman, Goldfarb, and Greenstein (2005) study the adoption of Internet across America. 8 Note that Twitter adoption and use may not actually be done explicitly by the politician himself. It is often the case that this task is delegated to a junior level staffer. Nevertheless, the politician often has to grant this right to a staffer. Throughout the paper we refer to the adoption decision as being a decision made by the politician, although it should be perfectly clear that interns/staffers are often involved. From each politician's Twitter account, we are able to obtain information about how many Twitter posts he made since becoming a member, as well as his following. The status of many in uential Twitter users is often identi ed using a popular measure of in uence (Comm, 2010) : the number of followers divided by the total number of Twitter posts. Presumably, those with a lot of inherent in uence need not post many updates on Twitter in order to maintain a strong following. Based on this crude measure of in uence, the most successful users of Twitter are Dennis Kucinich (109.6667), Eric Cantor (104.8368), Ron Paul (97.85263), Gwen Moore (92), and Alan Grayson (75.62376) . Their numbers are quite signi cant, given that the typical politician obtains a ratio of about 13 followers per Tweet. There is a lot of variation in this ratio; much of this variation cannot be explained by when a politician adopted as Figure 2 illustrates. Adopting early does not yield an obvious rst mover advantage with respect to this measure of clout.
The second major component of our data consists of aggregated information about his constituents, such as the district's average population, income and racial distribution. This information was obtained from the most recent U.S. Census. These variables may play a part in the decision to adopt, as Table 2 illustrates. Running the data through a simple probit reveals that population may be a key demographic driver in the adoption of Twitter. That is, politicians who govern heavily populated districts are more likely to adopt than those who govern smaller populations. Income and race appear to play less of a role in the adoption of Twitter. We also have information about each politician's personal and professional characteristics. For personal characteristics, we can identify the age, gender, race, degree type and whether he is Catholic. For political characteristics, we can see whether the politician is an incumbent, his tenure, party allegiance, the number of bills sponsored, the number of committees assigned to, and whether he chairs any committee. These variables may play a role in Twitter adoption. In particular, Table  2 shows that the number of bills has a positive and signi cant effect on the adoption of Twitter, while being a Democrat greatly reduces the likelihood of adoption. The fact that Republicans are more active in Twitter has generated a lot of media and scholarly attention. Therefore, party allegiance would certainly be an important control to include in any analysis about the speed of adoption among adopters. Economics, Vol. 10 [2011 ], Iss. 1, Art. 3 DOI: 10.2202 /1446 -9022.1255 We include dummies for whether each politician adopts MySpace, RSS, Flickr, Facebook and/or Yo u t u b e ; all of which are some alternative (and older) outlets for social media. Facebook is perhaps the closest to Twitter, in terms of its functionality and the way it is used by politicians. Representatives who hold both Facebook and Twitter accounts often post identical updates on both their Facebook and Twitter pages. Furthermore, Twitter and Facebook have recently made their interfaces compatible with one another; that is, you can update your Twitter account via Facebook, and vice versa. This has created some level of synergy between the two social media outlets. On top of that, we believe that Facebook is the closest proxy one can have for indicating a politician's past knowledge/expertise with social media. Consequently, one can certainly see the complementarity between these two technologies in Table 2 ; a large proportion of Twitter adopters are also Facebook users. Between the two social media outlets, Facebook is the rst mover, having had at least 2 years of a head start over Twitter. Not surprisingly, many of the politicians adopted Facebook well before they had the opportunity to adopt Twitter (Williams and Gulati, 2009 ).
10

Review of Network
Looking at Table 3 , we see that the average Twitter adopter is almost 60 years old, and has about 9 years in of ce. These numbers suggest that Twitter is not exclusively used by young politicians catering to their younger constituents. On average, a typical adopter is also quite active on K-Street, having sponsored about 18 bills, and being part of almost 2 committees (out of a possible 4).
Simple model of adoption delay
Consider a two period model in which a potential adopter's decision is whether to employ a new technology today, or tomorrow (with a discount rate of β < 1). Suppose that this potential adopter has received n signals about the technology's quality. This technology comes at no real monetary cost, and has value θ N(0;1=ρ θ ). Each signal is de ned as s n = θ + ε n , with ε n N(0;1=ρ ε ). Denote the history of observed signals as s n = fs 1 ;:::;s n g. Provided that the potential adopter is Bayesian, the updated mean and variance of θ are respectively given by Suppose that the agent has a very simple mean-variance utility,
where γ measures the agent's degree of risk aversion. For simplicity, set γ = 1. If the agent adopts today, he receives an expected utility of E(Ujs n ) = E(θjs n ) V(θjs n ).
Waiting until tomorrow can yield two possible outcomes: 1) The number of signals is still n with probability λ; or 2) the number of signals has increased to n + 1 with probability 1 λ. Therefore, the utility associated with adopting tomorrow (with the information available today) is
Note that the above equation uses the result that E[E(θjs n+1 )js n ] = E(θjs n ):
Therefore, the net bene t of adopting today over tomorrow is
The rst observation that comes to mind is that the constant term (1 β)(ρ θ +nρ ε )+(1 βλ)ρ ε is strictly greater than zero. This means that for certain values of E(θjs n ), the net bene t of adopting right away may be negative. However, for large enough values of E(θjs n ), the agent would certainly prefer to adopt today rather than tomorrow. Therefore, the incentive to adopt today increases (nontrivially) with E(θjs n ).
The net bene t of adopting today has limiting value of
From the limit points, we see that
Therefore, the net bene t of adopting today is larger when the agent's prior is very precise (i.e. ρ θ ! ∞) as compared to when the agent's prior is very diffuse (i.e. ρ θ ! 0). Intuitively, this result should be obvious: an agent who is given a choice between a certain payoff today, versus the same payoff tomorrow should certainly choose to receive the payoff today. Further investigation of the marginal effect of E(θjs n ) on the net bene t of adopting today reveals additional predictions. Given that the marginal effect of E(θjs n ) is
we can obtain its limiting value:
The marginal effect of E(θjs n ) is smaller when the agent's prior is very precise as compared to when his prior is very diffuse. One can show in a similar manner that the marginal effect of E(θjs n ) falls as the number of past signals tends to in nity. In general, favorable signals should only matter for those with little prior information.
One can also show that the net bene t is concave with respect to E(θjs n ) as ∂ 2 NB(E(θjs n );ρ θ )=∂E(θjs n ) 2 < 0. To summarize, this simple model generates the following testable predictions:
1. A large and favorable signal E(θjs n ) induces an agent to adopt the new technology sooner. 2. An agent with a precise prior ρ θ will adopt the new technology sooner. 3. The acceleration effect that E(θjs n ) has on technology adoption is small for an agent with a precise prior ρ θ . 4. The acceleration effect that E(θjs n ) has on technology adoption is small for an agent who has already received a large number of signals. 5. The acceleration effect is concave in E(θjs n ).
Empirical strategy
We rst outline the set of regressions aimed to test the ve predictions as motivated by our simple model. This discussion is followed by proposed estimations to evaluate whether adopting after favorable information signals actually pays off. The nal part discusses potential identi cation problems and complications that we may face with the data.
Do favorable signals speed up Twitter adoption?
Each politician is indexed by i = 1;:::;N, in the order in which they adopted Twitter, 1 being the rst adopter, and N being the last adopter. In our sample, N = 183. For each adopter i, we observe the exact date in which they adopted. Using each exact date, we construct the "days to adopt" variable, t i , by calculating the distance between the actual date of adoption, and Barack Obama's adoption date of April 29, 2007. By construction, t 1 < t 2 < ::: < t N . Each politician i has access to the information signals regarding the success of past Twitter adopters, i. We measure the information signal i received using the average number of followers/Tweet for all j < i, denoted by f i .
Note that this measure does not perfectly capture the actual set of signals that adopter i may receive, as f i is calculated using data we collected well after their adoption decisions. Consequently, we have to make an assumption that states: f i is invariant over time. That is, the followers/Tweet we observed at the time of data collection is a good proxy for the followers/Tweets potential adopters actually observed. This assumption is potentially very unattractive, as Twitter clout can easily change over time; say, if a politician improves the content of his Twitter posts over time. One necessary condition for our assumption is that f i is the same, regardless of when the data is collected. We test our assumption using data provided by Boynton (2010) that he used in a recent study. What his data has that ours does not is an additional day in which Twitter activity is recorded. In his sample, he observes Twitter activity (i.e., followers, following, and number of Tweets) for two time periods, January and June 2009. Therefore, we can check and see whether our calculated f i is likely to vary over time. A simple correlation analysis reveals that each politician's number of followers/Tweet is almost perfectly correlated 9 between the two dates. One may then stipulate that the followers/Tweet we use based on data collected on May 24, 2010 is a close proxy to the followers/Tweet that a potential adopter may have seen.
For each adopter i, we include control variables x i that may capture rank effects associated with technology adoption (Karshenas and Stoneman, 1993) . Our prior is that we do not expect estimates of γ to be signi cant, given that recent studies in political science (Lassen and Brown, 2010; Williams and Gulati, 2010) have been rather inconclusive regarding the impact of similar explanatory variables. Thus, our main regression can be written as
where ε i satis es the usual least-squares assumptions. With this regression, we can test the rst prediction from our model: a large favorable signal speeds up Twitter adoption. For our data to support the prediction, we need H 0 : β < 0. That is, the earliest adopters should have followed a sequence of successful adopters with on average, a large number of followers/Tweet.
It may also be interesting to study whether politicians discriminate across these signals. The easiest way to group the sequence of observed signals is to classify them as coming from the adopters belonging to the same or different political party as the potential adopter. Using this grouping, we construct the variables f i;own and f i;other to measure the average number of followers/Tweet among past adopters belonging to the same and other party as politician i respectively. Our model does not guide us to an obvious direction. What these variables may (or may not) tell us is whether the origin of information matters. For example, politicians from the same political party may have a greater awareness of one another, and therefore, greater awareness of their adoption outcomes. Furthermore, this specication may give us an idea about the sensitivity of our results with respect to how we group peers 10 .
To test the latter two predictions from our model, we need a variable that captures a politician's prior about social media. Given the positive correlation between Facebook and Twitter adoption (Table 3) , along with similar user interfaces, we argue that Facebook may be an appropriate indicator of whether a politician is 9 Correlation coef cient of over 0.95. 10 Refer to Manski (1993) .
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Review of Network Economics, Vol. 10 [2011 ], Iss. 1, Art. 3 DOI: 10.2202 /1446 -9022.1255 familiar with the merits of social media or not. Furthermore, as Facebook adoption took place well before Twitter adoption (Williams and Gulati, 2009 ), concerns about simultaneity between the two decisions may not be that relevant. The reader is asked to interpret Facebook adoption as such: those with Facebook accounts, and therefore, familiar with social media should have a more precise prior about the merits of Twitter than those without Facebook accounts. Therefore, setting the Facebook dummy equal to 1 is our way of approximating the case in which ρ θ ! ∞. That said, our regression to test the second and third predictions is:
For our data to support the second and third predictions, we need H 0 : β 2 < 0, and H 0 : β 3 > 0. Firstly, Twitter adoption should occur faster for those with Facebook accounts. Secondly, the acceleration effect with favorable past outcomes on adoption speed should be dampened if the politician already holds a Facebook account. To test our next hypothesis, we run the following estimation:
where (i 1) is the number of past adopters prior to i (i.e., the order of i's entry into Twitter). For the fourth hypothesis to hold, we need H 0 : β 3 > 0. All in all, these regressions should tell us whether adopters are making use of the information available, and whether those who appear to react strongly to this information are those who are likely to nd this information valuable.
Finally, to test for concavity, we consider
If the relationship between adoption speed and the average of past outcomes is concave, then we would need that H 0 : β 2 > 0: the marginal impact associated with f i is largest when evaluated at small values of f i .
Are favorable signals from the past associated with successful Twitter adoption today?
The estimations above tell us nothing about whether politicians are using their available information to increase their payoff. In this section, we outline the strategy used to assess whether politicians are making use of their information. Although we have no way of measuring the channels between information and adoption, then adoption to success, we can analyze the direct channel between past information and own success. Our model stipulates that those who receive positive signals are more likely to enter earlier. This behavior should intuitively generate a positive correlation between positive signals and own success should they be acting optimally.
Denoting own success at attaining followers/Tweet as f i , we carry out the following estimation
If favorable past signals are any indication of own success, we should see H 0 : β > 0. We repeat the same exercise as the previous section by running similar regressions that involve f i;own and f i;other , as well as regressions that include interaction terms between Facebook adoption and f i .
Identi cation
Although our data puts us in a unique position to analyze the impact of past available information on adoption speed, there are still a number of issues that prohibit us from clean identi cation. We now outline the numerous problems that may weaken our results, as well as ways in which we address them.
Unobserved heterogeneity
The data we use contains a lot of information about each politician. Nevertheless, a rich set of co-variates is an insuf cient solution to unobserved heterogeneity. It could very well be that those who face low (and unobserved) adoption costs are those who generate observed favorable signals as low adoption costs may be correlated with their technologically savvy. Furthermore, those with low adoption costs are likely to enter the Twittersphere rst. Therefore, those with low (but not the lowest) adoption costs who immediately follow these technologically politicians need not be doing so because of the favorable information they receive, but because they themselves have low adoption costs. Without panel data, it is virtually impossible to address these concerns.
Our prescription is to make two assumptions about the individual xed effect, ω i . The rst assumption is that it monotonically increases with i, which can be interpreted as: politicians who adopt later may be those who have high adoption costs, characterized by the xed effect. The second assumption is that each individual's xed effect is equally spaced; i.e., ω i ω i 1 = κ. These two assumptions allow us to write the xed effect recursively as ω i = (i 1)κ+ ω 1 . Including this term into the original estimation equation yields 
While this approach does not free us completely of issues related to unobserved heterogeneity, it provides us some way to add skepticism/conservatism to the estimates for β. In some respect, the inclusion of each adopter's order of entry captures both the order and stock effects as described by Karshenas and Stoneman (1993) .
Correlated errors
Adoption time is at a granular level and the time of adoption between two adopters can potentially be just days, so we should expect that the error terms of consecutive adopters may be correlated. For instance, those who adopted on different days, but within the same week may have received similar information shocks about the use of Twitter in politics, say, through the NY Times or the Wall Street Journal. The impact of past shocks may confound our identi cation of the so-called acceleration effect. Positive shocks that affected past adopters by increasing their followers/Tweet, may also induce subsequent adopters to enter soon after; therefore, early entry need not be explained by the presence of favorable information through past adopters' outcomes, but instead by the presence of favorable information through some other mechanism that simply carries over through time.
To address this relevant concern, we allow the error terms to be serially correlated with an AR(1) process. Therefore, we estimate
where ν i is assumed to be white noise. Recall that each adopter is ordered, so we are essentially specifying an empirical model that allows a current adopter's error to depend on the errors associated with those before him.
Selection bias
Our sample of Twitter adopters is a selected sample among the entire population of congressional members. Using a similar argument as our discussion about unobserved heterogeneity, early adopters may not necessarily be reacting to positive information shocks, but instead, to their own ability to use social media.
We can interpret the adoption and timing decisions as a two-step process. In the rst step, a representative decides whether to open up a Twitter account. Once they have decided to become a member, they must decide when. The rst stage decision can be modelled using the Probit estimates obtained in Table 3 . This rst stage will provide us the Heckman correction term as described by the Mills ratioφ i Φ i from the rst-stage adoption Probit estimates. To correct for this sample selection bias, we estimate the following second-stage regression with a Heckman correction term
An analogous strategy is employed for the analysis of own followers/Tweet.
Temporal factors
There is a clustering of Twitter adoption around the beginning of session, January 20, 2009. Therefore, we have cause for concern that some of these late adopters may not be adopting late because of bad signals, but simply because it was when congressional staffers were hired and assigned to manage members' Twitter accounts. We consider a sub-sample of politicians for which their adoption decisions are unlikely to be affected by this temporal shock: the sub-sample of politicians who entered Twitter, but not around the start of session within a 200 day window (i.e., 100 days before January 20, 2009, and 100 days after that date). One may also argue that the measure f i is very inaccurate for the initial adopters, as the averages may be computed with very few observations. This measure may therefore lack credibility for the earliest Twitter users. Consequently, we consider using estimations using only the sub-sample of adopters who follow at least 50 past users. Using this approach, we ensure that each politician's signal is calculated using at least 50 observations.
Contextual effects
As we are looking at the average outcomes of past adopters, our analysis can be framed under Manski's (1993) linear peer effects model. To some extent, the sequential and granular nature of our data frees us of some issues related to simultaneity of adoption decisions. What remains to be shown is that our results are robust to the correlated and contextual effects. Correlated effects describe the fact that early adoption may not be caused by favorable information shocks from their peers, but instead, the fact that early adopters share similar unobserved bene ts/costs associated with Twitter adoption. These unobserved components can either have a permanent component, or transitory component. For example, the 10th adopter may have opened up a Twitter account early because he behaves in the same way as other tech savvy politicians. To some extent, permanent unobserved group effects can be addressed using our earlier prescription for unobserved heterogeneity: controlling the order of entry may also control for these permanent correlated effects across adopters among similar cohorts. Transitory group effects may include the fact that early adopters face similar idiosyncratic shocks as other early adopters. This identi cation problem can be framed using our solution to correlated errors. Finding a large estimate for ρ would suggest that these unobservable group effects persist over time.
If contextual effects matter, they may even serve as a proxy for network externalities. Past adopters who come from Ivy league schools may have stronger alumni ties. These ties would be correlated with their own popularity on social media sites, like Twitter. Potential adopters may be induced to enter early not because of this observed Twitter clout, but because they wish to reach out to these wellconnected Ivy league politicians via Twitter. To some extent, the characteristics of past adopters partially (but not completely) controls for motives associated with network effects.
In order to control for these contextual effects, we include average characteristics of all past adopters, x i into the following regression
Main results
Many of our results support the predictions generated by the model. In the rst column of Table 4 , we see that increasing the followers/Tweet signal by 8 yields a statistically signi cant decrease in adoption time by nearly 112 days. Given that the average adopter takes about 695 days to adopt, this would amount to a reduction in delay by over 10%. Interestingly, the politicians do not appear to be discriminating across signals based on party lines, in that signals coming from their own and other party have about the same impact.
According the third and fourth columns, having a Facebook account speeds up the adoption of Twitter by at least 147 days. Our results are consistent with the idea that Facebook account holders likely have a more precise prior about the value of Twitter, and therefore, have less incentive to delay for the possibility of more information. Furthermore, we nd that the acceleration effect associated with the past adopters' signals is dampened by about 20 days for Facebook users. Interestingly, when signals are categorized by party, we nd that holding a Facebook account dampens the acceleration effect associated with the averaged signals from adopters belonging to the same party, but not for the averaged signals from adopters belonging to a different party. This result, found in the fourth column of Table 4 , suggests that while politicians do not appear to be discriminating signals based on parties, the way in which they use these signals may differ depending on where these signals come from. One possible explanation is that the signals coming from a rival party do not enter a politician's utility through a learning mechanism, but instead through a competition model, in which a politician feels pressure to compete for attention against his ideological rivals who have already garnered signi cant visible support on Twitter. Table 5 reveals that the interaction between an adopter's order (i.e., the number of those preceding him) and the average number of followers/Tweet among past adopters has a positive and signi cant coef cient. This nding provides some support for the fourth hypothesis generated by our simple model. Unlike the interactions between Facebook adoption and positive information signals, we nd that the dampening effect associated with the number of past adopters has the expected sign regardless of whether they are interacting with the signals coming from those of the same or other political party.
The effect associated with the squared average followers/Tweet is estimated to be positive and signi cant in the rst column of Table 6 . This means that the acceleration effect has its greatest marginal impact for small values of this average of past outcomes. Our nding here is consistent with the hypothesis which states that the marginal effect associated with past outcomes is concave.
The estimates for our control variables are in general quite noisy. Nevertheless, some have interesting signs. Members who belong to a large number of committees tend to take longer to adopt Twitter. This may highlight the fact that being in a number of committees results in a larger workload/responsibility, and therefore, less time/resources to devote towards social media management. It is also worth noting that not only are Democrats less likely to adopt Twitter (Table 3) , but also are they slower at adopting Twitter.
Our estimates in the rst two columns of Table 7 reveal a strong relationship between a politician's own realized number of followers/Tweet, and the average followers/Tweet of adopters prior to him. An increase in the past adopters' aggregated signal by 8 yields an increase in own followers/Tweet by over 8. This effect is slightly more pronounced when the signals come from past adopters' belonging to the same party, as shown in the second column. When the Facebook adoption interactions are introduced, the acceleration effect is slightly smaller; but this is perhaps because the interacting term between Facebook adoption and past adopters' signal is also positive. Indeed, those who receive favorable signals and are Facebook adopters than those who receive favorable signals but are not Facebook adopters. Table 7 : The relationship between own follower success and the follower success of past adopters. Followers/Tweet ( f i ) is an approximation based on the total number of followers divided by the total number of Twitter posts at the time of data collection.
(1) Robust standard errors in parentheses p < 0:05, p < 0:01, p < 0:001
The model presented earlier cannot explain this result. However, the observed phenomenon may still be consistent with the idea of Facebook as an indicator for preciseness of a politician's prior on social media value. Politicians who are more comfortable with social media may be able to better utilize the information available to them, while politicians who are not as comfortable with social media, while reacting strongly to positive signals, may not turn their adoption decision into realized success. Although past adopters' provide some idea as to the demand for politicians on Twitter, much of a politician's success on Twitter largely depends on his inherent ability to keep followers captivated with insightful and informative Twitter updates.
Our sensitivity analysis displayed in Table 9 reveals that the estimates for the acceleration effect are of the correct sign and statistically signi cant regardless of whether our regression accounts for unobserved heterogeneity, autocorrelation, or self selection. It is noteworthy that the magnitude of the effect drops signicantly when we allow the error terms to have an AR(1) structure. In fact, we nd that the magnitude of the effect falls to about 3 days (for an increase of 8 average followers/Tweet for past adopters). Furthermore, the Durbin-Watson test leads to a rejection of the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation. Therefore, much of the effect associated with the past adopters' aggregate signal confounds temporal shocks. Nevertheless, we nd it encouraging that the signals still play some, albeit small, role in the timing decision for Twitter adoption when correlated errors are introduced. Table 10 shows that for the most part, our results regarding own success are robust to the aforementioned identi cation problems. The estimated positive effect of past adopters' success on a current adopter's own success falls under the AR(1) model; note however that we are unable to reject the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation using the Durbin-Watson test. Therefore, the results in the second column lack statistical credibility.
Our results are preserved when we only use sub-samples of our original sample. The rst column of Table 11 shows that the acceleration effect holds even when we only consider adopters who started using Twitter outside the time interval surrounding the start of of ce. Similarly, the second column of Table 11 demonstrates that this effect holds when we exclude the earliest adopters, who have very little past adoption information to go on. Much the same can be said for the results in Table 12 , which show that the favorable information from the past lead to better realized outcomes. Table 9 : Robustness of results. The rst column controls for the order of entry, the second column controls for serial correlation, and the third column controls for sample selection using the 2-step Heckman method.
(1) Table 10 : Robustness of results. The rst column controls for the order of entry, the second column controls for serial correlation, and the third column controls for sample selection using the 2-step Heckman method.
(1) incumbents and the average number of committee chairs. Increasing the average proportion of incumbents by one standard deviation speeds up the time of adoption by 476 days, and increasing the average proportion of committee chairs by one standard deviation speeds up adoption by at least 75 days. The average proportion of past adopters who are black, Catholic, law degree holders and Ivy league graduates also accelerate the adoption process. All in all, these contextual effects are consistent with our intuition that some politicians may be adopting Twitter not only because of the information they receive from their peers, but also because of their desire to connect with their peers; especially those with political power (i.e., incumbents and chairs), and those with access to rich social networks (i.e., former lawyers and Ivy league alumni). Our analysis also suggests that politicians may bene t from these contextual effects. Table 14 hows that their realized number of followers/Tweet is positively associated with the average number of Catholics and Ivy league alumni among past adopters, as well as the average number of adopters who are chairs of congressional committees.
What makes these contextual effects compelling is the observation that own characteristics are unable to explain adoption timing nor own adoption success. Consequently, a n d i n glike this also limits our ability to say that social learning is the only story behind the patterns we observe: the alternative explanation involving network externalities is certainly plausible, as peer characteristics related to skill (i.e., political power) and peer characteristics related to networking (i.e., social characteristics) matter. Not surprisingly, the effect associated with past information falls as more and more of these contextual effects are included to each regression. This pattern may re ect the idea that our initial estimates confound both learning and network effects.
Extensions
In this subsection, we evaluate alternative interpretations of how politicians use the information they have at their disposal. For much of our analysis, we have assumed that the information signals are in the form of averaged past outcomes. This speci cation may be dubious for a few reasons. First, politicians may only have knowledge of recent signals; second, politicians may react to these signals only if past information has the potential to change their prior (i.e., positive/negative surprises); third, information quality may vary depending on the geographic distance of these signals; and nally, adoption timing may not be interpreted as a decision made solely by a politician.
The effect of past adopters' success is preserved when we add contextual effects as the last column of Table 13 shows. Some of the estimated contextual effects are worth mentioning. The strongest contextual effects are the average number of 31 Robust standard errors in parentheses p < 0:05, p < 0:01, p < 0:001
New information vs old information
Our analysis certainly suggests that the success of past adopters plays some role in the timing decision of Twitter adoption. What we don't know though is whether politicians take into account all of the signals. It is not plausible that the politicians or their staffers will pay attention to the success rates for each and every past adopter; especially for the late adopters who have over 100 possible signals to take in. In this section, we wish to test the hypothesis that only recent signals matter. To test this hypothesis, we compare the following speci cations:
1. One in which we only consider the 10 most recent past adopters when calculating the average followers/Tweet. 2. One in which we only consider the 20 most recent past adopters when calculating the average followers/Tweet. 3. One in which we consider the latter 10 (of the 20 most recent) past adopters when calculating the average followers/Tweet.
When we pass the data through these three different speci cations, some interesting patterns emerge as displayed in Table 15 . First, the effect associated with past adoption success is stronger for the rst speci cation than for the latter. This pattern means that when looking at the 20 most recent adopters, politicians react more strongly to the 10 most recent outcomes than to the 10 latter outcomes. Under the sequential learning paradigm, this result would suggest that newer information matters more. However, the effect is strongest in the second speci cation, in which all of the 20 recent outcomes are included when calculating the average. Although newer information trumps older information, politicians are not acting as though old information is completely useless.
As shown in Table 16 , the effect associated with the average followers/Tweet among recent adopters is negative across the board. It is noteworthy that the last speci cation yields the least negative effect, and the second speci cation yields the largest negative effect. Using recent information would not yield much of a payoff, especially if there are few observations to go by and if the information is based on relatively outdated outcomes. Table 15 : Which information signals matter? The rst speci cation (Column 1) de nes f i to be the average followers/Tweet among the 10 most recent adopters prior to i, the second speci cation (Column 2) de nes f i to be the average followers/Tweet among the 20 most recent adopters prior to i, and the third speci cation (Column 3) de nes f i to be thea average followers/Tweet among the latter 10 (of the 20 most recent adopters).
(1) Table 16 : Which information signals matter? The rst speci cation (Column 1) de nes f i to be the average followers/Tweet among the 10 most recent adopters prior to i, the second speci cation (Column 2) de nes f i to be the average followers/Tweet among the 20 most recent adopters prior to i, and the third speci cation (Column 3) de nes f i to be thea average followers/Tweet among the latter 10 (of the 20 most recent adopters).
(1) 
Positive and negative surprises
We now attempt to identify whether each politician's realized number of followers/Tweet was a positive or negative surprise given his ex ante expectation. It is of course impossible to perfectly estimate each politician's expectation; however, we 35 Robust standard errors in parentheses p < 0:05, p < 0:01, p < 0:001 can obtain predicted values, E( f i ), of the realized followers/Tweet using the estimates from Table 6 . Using this proxy for expected success, we identify a positive surprise as the case when the realized followers/Tweet exceeds a politician's expectation, f i E( f i ) > 0, and a negative surprise if the opposite is true,
With these values, we can then approximate the average proportion of positive (and negative) surprises among past adopters. Intuitively, we should see that an increase in the proportion of positive surprises have a similar impact as an increase in the expected value associated Twitter adoption. The opposite should hold with respect to negative surprises. Framing our analysis in this manner gives us the ability to check how sensitive our results are to the interpretation of ex ante expectations. Table 17 suggests that positive surprises behave in a similar manner as increases in the average number of followers/Tweet among past adopters. A standard deviation increase in the percentage of positive surprises yields a decrease in adoption time by about 256 days. Negative surprises have the opposite effect: an increase in the percentage of negative surprises yields an increase in adoption time by about 23 days. Here we see that politicians react more strongly to positive surprises, than to negative surprises.
Does geography matter?
Earlier analysis has already shown that politicians do not discriminate between information from past outcomes of peers who belong to the same political party, and past outcomes of peers who belong to a different party. But the same may not be Table 18 : Does geography matter? Here, f i;samestate is de ned as the average number of followers/Tweet among past adopters whose districts are in the same state as i, and f i;dif f state is de ned as the average number of followers/Tweet among past adopters whose districts are not in the same state as i. true if politicians have an opportunity to discriminate based on geography. The relationship between geographic distance and information quality is well established (Malloy, 2005) , so we would expect that politicians prefer to synthesize information from sources nearest them. Although the past outcomes are observable to all, there may be additional parcels of information that cannot be conferred through this statistic alone; such as details regarding functionality, suggested Twitter topics, and general sentiment among constituents who discuss politics on Twitter.
In this extension, we consider the possibility that politicians discriminate across signals based on whether these signals come from past adopters who govern districts within the same state, or whether these signals originate from outside of their respective home states. Tables 18 and 19 display the results from our estimations using these new de nitions for past adoption success. In general, politicians react similarly to both sources of information. The difference is the magnitude to which they speed up adoption. We nd that a standard deviation change by 5 followers/Tweet among politicians belonging to a different state yields 3 times the effect than that associated with the same change to the followers/Tweet among politicians within the same state. One alternative explanation for this observation is that Twitter is also used to maintain connections between politicians and citizens outside of their main constituent base. By reaching out to constituents belonging to districts of their peers, a politician may achieve greater success at coercing his rivals to support contentious bills/policies by rst establishing a "grassroots" movement in districts beyond their jurisdiction. When we analyze the impact of past adoption success on own realized success, we are only able to nd a positive relationship between own success and favorable information coming out of the same state. This nding suggests that politicians are using information from different sources differently. The fact that politicians accelerate adoption in light of good signals near them, and that these good signals also bene t them ex post provides some evidence of informational advantage based on geography. At this point, we can only speculate about the true motivation behind rapid adoption in light of good signals coming outside of their state.
Differential effects associated with staffer connections and of ce size
As we mentioned earlier in this paper, the decision to adopt/use Twitter may be made by the politician himself, and/or someone from his staff. Anecdotal survey evidence suggests that one third of Tweets are made by staffers alone, one third by the politician alone, and the remaining one third by both the politician and staffers 11 . If staffers have a non-trivial role in the adoption/use of Twitter, adoption may be in uenced by (social) factors well beyond those captured by outcomes and characteristics of other politicians. We expect this case if current staffers are either connected with former staffers working in in uential organizations and lobby groups, or if the politician has a large number of staffers on hand to Tweet on his behalf. Under these scenario, do outcomes of past adopters still matter? 11 We thank Christine Williams for providing us this insight.
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(1) To get a preliminary answer to this question, we turn to the Revolving Door database on OpenSecrets.org. For each politician, we are able to obtain the number of former staffers who now work in the private sector. For example, the politicians who have the largest number of former staffers through the revolving door are John Dingell (22), Connie Mack (18), John Boehner (17), Roy Blunt (12) and Ed Markey (12). With this additional data, we can therefore break up the sample into two groups: 1) the sub-sample of politicians who have no industry-connected former staffers, and 2) the sub-sample of politicians who have at least one industryconnected former staffer.
We also supplement our data with information about the number of staffers each politician has on his payroll at the time of Twitter adoption. This information is obtained from the Legistorm database. The of ce size ranges from 12 to 36 staffers, where 21 is the average. Given that the average size is 21, we break up the sample into: 1) the sub-sample of politicians who have fewer than 21 staffers at the time of Twitter adoption; and 2) the sub-sample of politicians who have at least 21 staffers at the time of Twitter adoption.
By partitioning our sample into separate groups, de ned based on staffer connections or of ce size, we can evaluate whether the acceleration effect is robust to unobservable factors that may in uence staffers in the adoption of Twitter. Table 21 : Differential effects associated with staffer connections. The rst specication (Column 1) focuses on the sub-sample of politicians who have no (former) staffers identi ed as having connections with industry, while the second specication (Column 2) focuses on the sub-sample of politicians who have at least one (former) staffer identi ed as having connections with industry.
(1) connected former staffers to the sub-sample of politicians with at least one industryconnected former staffer. An analogous pattern can be found in the analysis of own success, as shown in Table 21 . Indeed, current staffers may be adopting Twitter as a means to connect with their former in uential colleagues 12 . Tables 22 and 23 illustrate that the magnitude of the acceleration effect also falls if we move from the sub-sample of politicians with small of ces to the subsample of politicians with large of ces. The number of industry-connected former staffers may be a proxy for a politician's of ce size; a natural interpretation is that politician with a large number of employees likely has greater resources to devote to Twitter and other forms of social media.
Despite drops in magnitude for both cases, the acceleration effect is still economically and statistically signi cant when we focus on the sub-sample of politicians with connected staffers, or when we focus on the sub-sample of politicians with a large number of employees 13 . Table 22 : Differential effects associated with of ce size. The rst speci cation (Column 1) focuses on the sub-sample of politicians who have fewer than 22 staffers at the time of adoption, while the second speci cation (Column 2) focuses on the sub-sample of politicians who have at least 22 staffers at the time of adoption.
(1) Table 23 : Differential effects associated with of ce size. The rst speci cation (Column 1) focuses on the sub-sample of politicians who have fewer than 22 staffers at the time of adoption, while the second speci cation (Column 2) focuses on the sub-sample of politicians who have at least 22 staffers at the time of adoption.
Conclusion
Our analysis exploits a unique feature about the adoption of Twitter in Congress: knowing the exact date of adoption allows us to analyze not only the speed of adoption, but also all the information available at the time of adoption. Knowing who the past adopters are, as well as their success at attaining followers/Tweet, gives a current adopter valuable information about the value of Twitter as a mode for public in uence. Twitter is primarily a broadcasting device for politicians (Golbeck, Grimes and Rogers, 2010) , so being able to assess its outreach capabilities is especially important to politicians and their staffers.
Guided by our simple model of adoption delay, we nd that favorable information leads to quicker adoption, and especially for those who have diffuse priors. Furthermore, we nd that politicians who adopt Twitter after receiving favorable information signals bene t via increased clout for their own Twitter presence upon adoption. Although our results are suggestive of social learning, we cannot completely rule out alternative explanations such as network externalities.
The unique feature of our data suffers from some of the problems associated with time series analysis. Given that the adoption decisions are at times clustered near one another, persistent temporal shocks limit our ability to make any strong statements regarding the impact of information on adoption speed. In spite of this limitation, we are still able to demonstrate an acceleration effect consistent with our model's main prediction.
Although our extensions explore different avenues to which these signals affect politicians, our analysis abstracts from learning within well-de ned social networks. Politicians do not appear to react differently to signals coming from different parties; nevertheless, it is plausible that they may react strongly to signals coming from those they frequently contact. Some possible networks/groupings that could be considered may be based on the congressional committees. A challenge of using these de nitions is that network/group formation likely takes place around the same time as Twitter adoption. Alternatively, future work could incorporate the use of alumni networks, as in Cohen and Malloy (2010) , and investigate whether signals coming from alumni connections have a stronger effect at accelerating Twitter adoption than signals coming from outside of the alumni network.
